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A Parsimonious Agent Causation 
Steven Guillemette1 
Abstract 
Free will and moral responsibility share an intricate relationship. Whether we deem 
an agent morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy depends, in part, on whether 
or not the act was “performed freely”. However, numerous difficulties emerge when 
one tries to articulate what “performed freely” entails: one must not only provide an 
account of free will with reference to its nature, he or she must also take into 
consideration its compatibility, or lack thereof, with existing and/or potential 
features of the world. Ultimately, this paper attempts to do just that, to provide an 
account of free will that is both coherent and naturalistic. Consequently, I argue that 
such an account be contrived under the umbrella of agent-causal libertarianism using 
the mechanics of quiescence.   
1 Introduction 
Whether we deem an agent as morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy depends, 
in part, on whether the act was performed freely. However, numerous difficulties emerge 
when one tries to express what performed freely entails. It is my goal, then, to resolve 
these difficulties by providing a coherent account of free will.  
In §1, I examine literature to supply an understanding of free will, including theories 
regarding its nature and its various debates. In §2, I consider contemporary objections 
to agent-causal libertarianism, a philosophical position concerning free will. In §3, I 
provide my own account of agent-causal libertarianism outlining its requirements in 
detail. Finally, in §4 I address possible objections to my account. Ultimately, it is my 
position that agent-causal libertarianism remains a tenable view worthy of consideration 
in current free will debates. 
 
2 Free will and Determinism 
There are two main conceptions of the nature of free will. 2  According to the first 
conception, an action is up to the agent if he “could have done otherwise,” or, rather, if 
there were alternative possibilities open to him (Kane, 1998, 32). For example, one might 
say that the Greek hero Odysseus has free will in choosing to confront Scylla if he could 
have confronted Charybdis instead, or even refrained from entering the deadly strait 
altogether. According to the second, less familiar conception, an action is up to the agent 
if he is ultimately responsible for it (Kane, 1998, 35). Using the example above, one 
might say that Odysseus has free will if he, and nothing else, is the ultimate reason for 
his choice to confront Scylla. This holds, even if there were no other alternatives open 
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to him at that time. Ordinarily, philosophers define and analyse free will along one of 
these two conceptions (van Inwagen, 1983); however, it is not uncommon to think free 
will involves both.  
In addition to the nature of free will, much has been written regarding the thesis of 
causal determinism.  In short, causal determinism assumes that all present and future 
occurrences are necessarily determined by past events and the laws of nature. Take, for 
example, the act of throwing dice. If one knew the position of the dice upon its release, 
its properties, and the laws of nature (i.e., the laws of gravitation, classical mechanics, 
etc.), then he could reasonably determine where the dice would come to rest after it was 
thrown (Timpe, 2013, 18). Now, according to the thesis of causal determinism, the world 
operates like the dice in the sense that the non-relational past and relevant laws of 
nature causally determine our behaviour. 
Generally, philosophers fall into camps to explain how the thesis of causal determinism 
operates with respect to free will. Compatibilists argue that the existence of free will is 
compatible with the truth of causal determinism. Strictly speaking, if scientists were to 
discover that causal determinism is true, agents could still perform at least some actions 
freely. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, argue that the existence of free will is 
incompatible with the truth of causal determinism such that an agent acts freely only if 
casual determinism is false. In any case, it is important to point out, as Timpe suggests, 
that “neither position by itself is making a claim about whether or not agents actually 
do possess free will” (Timpe, 2013, 18). However, there are several subgroups which do 
make this claim, such as libertarianism. 
 
3 Libertarianism 
Libertarianism is an account on which incompatibilism is true. Thus, it holds that free 
will exists. Simply put, “one acts freely only if one’s action was not determined – directly 
or indirectly – by forces outside one’s control” (Moreland, 2009, 41). Consequently, 
libertarians bear the burden of proof in showing that the thesis of causal determinism 
is in some way false.3 Assuming they accomplish this onerous endeavour (which, for the 
purposes of this paper, I will accept); libertarians still must show how their variety of 
freedom is possible and even intelligible.  
 
3.1 Noncausation or Simple Indeterminism 
Typically, there are three ways to explain libertarian freedom. One way, headed by Ginet 
(1990, 1997, and 2002) and McCann (1998, and 2012), is to assert “neither that a free 
action has any internal causal structure nor that it be caused by anything at all” (Clarke, 
2003, 17). Accounts such as these are labelled non-causal or simple indeterministic 
because they do not require any positive conditions on freedom; even overt actions that 
are a function of basic decisions and reasons are noncausal. One consequence of these 
accounts, then, is that a decision can be completely up to the agent; however, as Clarke 
has pointed out, the problem with them is that they “fail to provide adequate accounts 
of active control and acting for reasons” (Clarke, 2003, 24). Assuming this objection 
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holds, (and I think it does given Clarke’s reasoning above,) one can find an intelligible 
account of libertarian free will only among causal views; that is, views that describe how 
an agent is able to cause her choices freely.  
 
3.2 Event-Causation 
Event-causation is another way to explain libertarian freedom. On this view, both relata 
in the causal relation of a choice (i.e., the cause and effect) are taken to be events. 
However, unlike compatibilism, event-causal libertarianism maintains that some events 
are caused indeterministically. For example, suppose Ted is deliberating about whether 
to rock out with Bill tonight. However, he also wants to complete his final history report 
so he does not fail his history class, prompting his father to send him to military school 
in Alaska and dashing his dreams of forming a band. After carefully considering his 
reasons for performing each action, Ted decides to complete his history report. 
According to the event-causal libertarian, Ted’s desire to complete his report causes his 
behaviour, but it does not sufficiently determine his behaviour – there is still a chance 
his alternative desire to rock out could have caused him to perform that action instead.  
As with non-causal accounts, event-causal libertarians face several objections, such as 
a lack of rational explicability and loss of control.4 If it is true that decisions are caused 
indeterministically, then it seems like the agent would lack sufficient control over his 
actions, thereby undermining his responsibility for that action. In response, some argue 
that the indeterminacy should be placed before the decision, in the deliberative process, 
rather than at the moment of decision (Mele, 1995). In this way, the agent can still be 
responsible for the action, even though it is caused indeterministically. However, as I 
explain below (§5.3), this response is problematic.  
 
3.3 Agent-Causation 
The final way to explain libertarian freedom and the account I adopt in this paper, is 
termed agent-causation. Agent-causation is similar to event-causation in that a free 
decision cannot be causally determined. However, it differs in that the cause of a free 
choice or volition (i.e., the first causal relatum) is not an event at all, but rather an agent. 
Randolph Clarke summarizes the requirements of such a view as follows: 
“On a common version of such a view, it is required (1) that a directly free 
decision or other directly free action be caused by the agent; (2) that 
neither the decision (or other action) nor the agent’s causing that decision 
(or other action) be causally determined by events; and (3) that this 
causation by the agent not consist in causation by events.”  
(Clarke, 2003, 133-134) 
In such a way, the agent, or substance, is the ultimate source and sole originator of her 
free choices – she and nothing outside of her is responsible. Given this framework, one 
can examine a few problems facing this account. 
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4 Problems with Agent Causation 
4.1 The Problem of Reason-Explanation 
The first problem (or set of problems) relevant to agent-causal accounts concerns the 
reason-explanation of free choice. It is widely thought that if an agent acts according to 
reasons, then her recognition of those reasons, by citing them, will inevitably provide 
an explanation for why she chose to perform that action (Clarke, 2003, 21). In other 
words, reason-explanation contributes to an intelligible account of active control; if 
there are no reasons then there can be no active control.  
One difficulty with reason-explanation is that agent-causal libertarians are committed 
to a non-reductive causal analysis; that is, they deny that events outside or within the 
agent (e.g. beliefs, dispositional states, reasons, etc.) can directly cause an agent’s free 
choice. If they do concede this non-reductive analysis and argue that agential events 
directly cause a free choice, then they are no longer arguing for agent-causation, but 
rather event-causation. However, if the agent does remain committed to this analysis, 
it would seem that the agent has less control then if he did have reasons determining 
his behaviour. Ultimately, the agent-causal libertarian must provide an alternate 
account of reason-explanation to avoid overt mysteriousness and to justify active 
control. 
 
4.2 Problem of Luck 
Equally challenging is the problem of luck because it seems to impede agent’s control 
over their actions. In the past several years, the “luck objection” has taken many 
different forms by philosophers both for and against agent-causal libertarianism; 
however, Balaguer’s (2002) interpretation concisely captures the objection.5 Simply put, 
“If a decision is undetermined at the moment of choice, then given the same past, the 
agent could just as easily have made another choice without anything about the agent 
changing, and so the agent could not be the source of, or have control over the choice” 
(Balaguer, 2002, 388).  
Using the above example, suppose Ted istorn between rocking out with Bill and 
completing his final history report. Eventually, Ted chooses to complete his final history 
report in lieu of rocking out. Nevertheless, had one somehow turned back time, Ted 
could have easily chosen to rock out instead. It seems, then, that it is just a matter of 
luck, or perhaps chance, whichever choice Ted decides to make; and if it is just chance, 
then Ted is not really in control. Firstly, we should note that he problem of luck is not 
only a problem for libertarians, but also a problem for ethicists considering it is found 
in most philosophical discussions of moral responsibility. Nevertheless, it is still up to 
the agent-causal libertarian and not the ethicist to show that agential actions are not 
simply random since non-random, agential actions will contribute to a more coherent 
theory of agent causation. 
 
                                                          




5 A Naturalistic Account of Agent-Causation 
The libertarian account defended in this paper is a modification of Rogers’ account. It is 
rooted in Anselmian thought insofar as it employs a term coined by Anselm: pervelle, 
loosely translated as “per-will”.6  According to Rogers, the term “per-will…expresses the 
important technical concept that the choice for B [over A] is the successful continuation 
of desiring B to the end of the TC [torn condition] stage so it becomes the effective 
intention” (Rogers, 2015, 92). Given this description, one way an agent’s free choice 
might proceed is as follows: at T(1) an agent, S, encounters a torn decision regarding 
whether to opt for A over B, two mutually exclusive events. Then, at T(2), following T(1), 
the torn decision terminates and the agent per-wills A instead of B. However, 
immediately upon termination of the torn decision and thereafter, the agent could have 
per-willed B instead of A.  
Initially, this account seems similar to the event-causal account described in §3.2 
insofar as it gives prominence to torn decisions, a specific subset of decisions. However, 
it differs in a few crucial ways. First, as with all agent-causal accounts, the agent and 
not prior events, causes a directly free decision or action. Second, this account employs 
an Anselmian concept, pervelle, as a model for free choice based on quiescence. Finally, 
the relevant indeterminacy necessary for libertarian free choice occurs at the moment 
of choice rather than proceeding it.  
 
5.1 Torn Decisions 
According to Balaguer (2002, 382), “a torn decision is a decision in which the person in 
question (a) has reasons for two or more options and feels torn as to which set of reasons 
is strongest, i.e., has no conscious belief as to which option is best, given her reasons; 
and (b) decides without resolving this conflict.”  
Looking back at Ted’s predicament, one might notice that certain reasons motivate his 
choice to rock out with Bill: certainly, it produces great pleasure for him, and helps him 
hone his skills as a guitarist for his band, “Wyld Stallyns”. However, one might also 
notice that certain reasons motivate his choice to finish the history report: if he does 
not complete it, he will fail his history course prompting his father to send him to 
military school in Alaska and ending his career as musician. Suppose he deliberates for 
a while, but is unable to discern which set of reasons is stronger. Nevertheless, Ted 
chooses to complete his history report even though his reasons for doing so did not 
outweigh his reasons for rocking out. As a matter of course, he just chooses.  
In many ways torn decisions are reminiscent of what Kane (1998, 107-115) calls “self-
forming actions,” which are “undetermined, regress stopping voluntary actions” that 
presuppose “plural rationality.” However, there are two key differences. First, as Rogers 
(2015, 91) claims, torn decisions are mostly conscious experiences. It seems that agents 
are at least somewhat aware of their reasons for decisions, even though subconscious, 
dual willings (i.e. situations in which the agent has good reasons to choose A and B even 
though they are mutually exclusive) may come into play (Rogers, 2015, 91). Second, 
even though one may agree with Kane that if determinism is true, torn decisions could 
be causally determined by the natural universe (e.g., by events in our mind), one may 
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disagree with Kane regarding where he locates the relevant indeterminism necessary for 
libertarian freedom. On his view, the indeterminism proceeds the choice, occurring 
during the torn condition, but as argued in §5.3, the indeterminism should be located 
at the moment of choice so as to avoid a further objection. At any rate, it is important 
to recognize that torn decisions involve a conscious, internal struggle between two 
mutually exclusive events, or motivating circumstances. Given this description, one may 
now turn to the Anselmian concept of pervelle to explain agent-causation. 
 
5.2 Parsimonious Per-willing and Quiescence 
On Rogers’ account, the agent opts for B over A by per-willing (i.e. by continually desiring 
B until it becomes an effective intention) (Rogers, 2015, 96). Initially, it looks as if this 
account has a lot going for it: it does not introduce any new causal powers beyond the 
existing desires preceding the choice and the opting for B over A is under the agent’s 
control. However, it is still unclear how A becomes overridden the instant B is per-willed. 
If, at T(1), S desires both A and B, and then at T(2), he per-wills B so it becomes the 
intention, why does the desire for A simply go away? To some, this may seem oddly 
mysterious and, therefore, problematic. As a possible response to this objection, I 
propose the dropping out of a non-per-willed action be understood along the lines of 
quiescence, as explained below.  
In Stump’s Aquinas, she argues that the human will has three positions regarding some 
issue: 
“The will can assent to something or reject it, but it can also simply do 
nothing at all. It can just be turned off; it can be inactive or 
quiescent…Furthermore, in principle, the will can move directly from any 
one of these positions to another. That is, in general, it can move from 
rejecting to quiescence, from quiescence to assenting, from assenting to 
rejecting, and so on”  
(Stump, 2003, 394). 
Given this description, Stump goes on to say that nothing external to the agent causes 
her state of quiescence, “it is always in the will’s own power to be quiescent or not” 
(Stump, 2003, 401).  
In order to explain how an agent’s will becomes quiescent, Timpe (2007, 290) suggests 
we appeal to Dowe’s analysis of “causation by omission”. Simply put, Dowe’s view is that 
causation by omission is not a genuine cause at all, but rather, “a counterfactual 
claim…about the mere possibility of causation” (Dowe, 2001, 216). In other words, 
omissions are cases in which a genuine cause is possible and therefore, “they can be 
cited in causal explanations. As a result, we can treat them as ‘quasi-causes’.” (Kittle, 
2015, 92). Using this information as a framework, Timpe develops a theory of control 
whereby an agent controls an event e when either (1) an action of the agent causes e to 
occur; or (2) an omission by the agent quasi-causes e to occur (Timpe, 2007, 292). Now, 
applying the mechanics of quiescence and Timpe’s theory of causation to Rogers’ 
account of pervelle one can explain the dropping away of a non-per-willed action. To 
appreciate this, consider a free choice made by Ted. Suppose, at T(1), Ted encounters a 
torn decision regarding whether to rock out with Bill or to complete his final history 
report. Soon after, at T(2), Ted ceases to be torn and per-wills the completion of his 
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history report until it becomes an effective intention. Immediately upon per-willing the 
completion of his history report, we can say that Ted becomes quiescent to his desire to 
rock out; that is, only when Ted per-wills the completion of his history report does Ted 
also quasi-cause the completion of his history report through the omission of rocking 
out. In this way, Ted is morally responsible for the outcomes of both his action and his 
non-action (i.e., his omission) in a manner that is not overtly mysterious.  
 
5.3 Indeterminacy 
Towards the end of §5.1 it was mentioned that placing the relevant indeterminism prior 
to the agent’s choice could prove problematic for the libertarian. If, as Kane suggests, 
“[a free choice] one way or the other is undetermined because the process preceding it 
and potentially terminating in it (i.e., the effort of will to overcome temptation) is 
indeterminate,” then the indeterminate process (viz., neurons firing one way or another) 
could probabilistically cause the agent’s behaviour, introducing an element of luck 
(Kane, 1998, 128). For example, suppose Tom, through some indeterminate process, 
deliberates between two mutually exclusive events, A and B. After serious thought, Tom 
ceases to deliberate and his desire for A probabilistically motivates his choice to A. 
However, it just may be that the indeterminate process preceding the choice terminates 
in neurons randomly firing one way when they could have fired another way. Ultimately, 
it does seem lucky that this indeterminate process could be responsible for causing an 
undetermined choice. 
As a response to this objection, I suggest one place the relevant indeterminacy at the 
moment of choice. In doing so, external events (e.g., indeterminate processes, neurons, 
or the relevant laws of physics) could not cause the agent to choose as she does 
(Balaguer, 2002, 387). And if one juxtaposes a lack of external causation with 
intentional choice, as Balaguer suggests, then it is true to say that the agent is the sole 
originator of her free choices; that is, she has complete authorship and control over her 
free choices (ibid, 387).  
 
6 Agent-Causal Problems Revisited 
In §4, I introduced a couple problems that could threaten the adequacy of any agent-
causal libertarian account. These problems are the reason-explanation of libertarian 
free choice and the problem of luck. The remainder of this paper dispels these threats 
with respect to the account provided above. 
 
6.1. Problem of Reason-Explanation Revisited 
Recall from §4.1 that the agent-causal libertarian is committed to a nonreductive 
analysis; that is, they deny that events outside or within the agent (e.g., beliefs, 
dispositional states, etc.) can directly cause a free choice. However, as the objection 
goes, if there are no reasons that cause an agent’s actions or behaviour, then she has 
no active control over her actions or behaviour. Ultimately, the task of the agent-causal 
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libertarian is to provide an alternate account of reason-explanation to justify active 
control. 
Like Leibniz (1714) and Chrisholm (1964), I would argue that an agent’s reasons 
motivate or incline without necessitating the making of a free decision, since 
necessitation would preclude agent causation. What this means is that, “[reasons] do 
not, on their own, cause the agent to decide as she does. Rather what makes the relevant 
difference is the agent’s causal contribution to the decision” (Haji, 2008, 178). In such 
a way, an agent’s free choice is motivated by a reasons-based element and caused by 
agent-causal element. To appreciate this, consider again a free choice made by Tom. 
Suppose, at T(1), Tom encounters a torn decision regarding whether to order a salad or 
a burger, two mutually exclusive events. Before long, at T(2), Tom ceases to be torn and 
per-wills that he order a salad in lieu of ordering a burger. The point here, is that Tom’s 
reasons for ordering a salad or a burger at T(1) motivate his choice to order a salad or a 
burger, but they do not necessitate his choice. It is the inclusion of the agent-causal 
element that allows Tom to per-will, thereby causing, his ordering of the salad at T(2). 
Ultimately, this account of reasons-explanation grants the active control the agent-
causal libertarian seeks without being arbitrary. However, it is still unclear why the 
agent chooses one option over the other, a problem to which I now turn.  
 
6.2 Problem of Luck Revisited 
As stated above, the problem of luck goes something like this: 
“If a decision is undetermined at the moment of choice, then given the 
same past, the agent could just as easily have made another choice 
without anything about the agent changing, and so the agent could not 
be the source of, or have control over the choice”  
(Balaguer, 2002, 389)  
 
However, this objection does not hold. As Balaguer argues, even though Ted was torn 
at the moment of decision, meaning neither set of reasons pick out the best option, it 
does seem like he has a rationale for making a choice: namely, that he does not remain 
in a state of indecision (ibid, 389). Consequently, Ted has good reason to choose one 
option over the other, even though one option might not be clearly better than the other. 
Furthermore, we might say that what explains Ted’s reasons for choosing to finish his 
history report in lieu of rocking out is simply Ted’s acceptance of his reasons for that 
choice (Pruss, 2006, 135). That is to say, his reasons for completing his history report 
provide sufficient explanation for his choice even if they were not necessitating reasons. 
Had he chosen to rock out instead, his reasons for that decision would sufficiently 
explain his choice. Ultimately, though, it is important to understand that whichever 
choice Ted decides to make, he is still the source of his choice and in control insofar as 






The purpose of this paper is to offer a naturalistic and coherent account of agent-
causation that is not overtly mysterious or incoherent. Using Rogers’ account as a 
starting point, I have argued that the dropping away of a non-per-willed desire is best 
understood using the mechanics of quiescence. In addition, I have demonstrated that 
the relevant indeterminacy necessary for libertarian free will should occur at the 
moment of choice as opposed to proceeding it. Suitably, the next step for agent-causal 
libertarians is to develop their understanding of the nature of indeterminacy, that is, to 
understand how it might occur in the process of free choice and in what proximity. 
Ultimately, such an understanding will have vast implications on our understanding of 
free will and moral responsibility.  
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